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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the problem of collecting property taxes in fiscally decentralized 
developing economies. The property tax is arguably the most important source of 
own revenues for local governments around the world, and economists generally 
agree that, although imperfect, the property tax is a good local tax. In practice, 
however, the property tax does not always become a productive revenue source and 
local governments do not gain the fiscal autonomy required to realize the benefits of 
fiscal decentralization. This problem is rather common among developing economies 
and particularly severe in Latin America. One of the main reasons for the poor tax 
performance of Latin American countries seems to be the lack of administrative 
capacity at the local level. This problem is notably aggravated, we argue, by a 
deficient design of the fiscal decentralization system. We also identify the main 
determinants of property tax performance in Latin American countries, and provide 
guidance for future reforms in the region.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The property tax is arguably the most important source of own revenues for local governments 
around the world. Many fiscally decentralized economies as well as an increasing number of 
countries that have embarked upon a decentralization process look at the property tax as the main 
source of revenue autonomy for their sub-national governments. This practice is well matched 
with policy principles. There is widespread agreement among economists and decentralization 
experts on that, although not entirely perfect, the property tax possesses several characteristics 
that are desirable in the context of sub-national government finance.  
Besides its theoretical advantages, however, in practice not everything is well with the 
property tax. The property tax is difficult to implement, costly to administer, and unpopular 
among taxpayers. It is well known that many countries around the world struggle to produce any 
significant amounts of revenue from this tax source. These difficulties are more prevalent among 
developing countries and, particularly in Latin America, the property tax continues to be a 
predominant policy concern among policymakers. With very few exceptions, Latin American 
countries have not been able to develop revenue-productive property tax systems. Moreover, 
Latin America has been identified in the economic literature as a region with relatively low tax 
effort (Bird et al., 2006), and with a level of tax revenue performance that is lower than the 
average in developing and transition countries (Bird et al., 2008; Ahmad and Brosio, 2008). The 
problems of low tax effort and revenue performance are especially acute and challenging in the 
case of the property tax.  
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the causes of the poor tax performance of 
the property tax in Latin America and to identify policies that could help with the current 
impasse. Part of what we find is conventional wisdom. The lack of financial and technical means 
to assemble accurate, comprehensive and updated cadastres is clearly one of the main reasons 
explaining the lackluster performance of the property tax. In fact, there is an extensive literature 
addressing these issues and suggesting more feasible alternatives to the assessment of property 
values. All these lessons are relevant to Latin America and they should be internalized by 
policymakers. But we also arrive at less conventional findings. Previous analyses of the 
performance of the property tax have given much less attention to the design of the fiscal 
decentralization system within which the property tax must operate. The arrangement of fiscal 
incentives in the decentralization system, we contend, can also play a crucial role in determining 
the extent to which the property tax is used in practice. We argue that the realignment of fiscal 
incentives must be an important part of the solution for a more effective use of the property tax 
in the region.  
We emphasize the mutual dependence between a sound fiscal decentralization process 
and the successful devolution of the property tax to local governments. In order to become a 
productive revenue source, the decentralization of the property tax also requires that local 
authorities be politically accountable to their communities,  be endowed with a significant degree 
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of fiscal autonomy, face the correct incentives within the context of central government policies, 
and have sufficient administrative capacity to carry out tax and expenditure policies.  
A few words on the scope of the paper are in order at this time. The concept of property 
is a broad one, encompassing different forms of wealth over which different taxes can be 
applied. In general, we can differentiate between real or immovable property, which includes 
land and structures, from personal property, consisting of those tangible and intangible assets 
that are not attached to the land. In addition, taxes can be applied to the stock of properties, their 
transfer, or the capital gains realized on their sale. This paper focuses on the annual taxation of 
the stock of immovable property, which is generally considered among the most efficient modes 
of property taxation and constitutes the bulk of property tax revenues around the world.
1
  
In this paper we also distinguish between the analysis of property tax collections at the 
sub-national level within a country and that across countries. We explain that certain variables 
that are exogenous for sub-national governments within a country, like the legal and institutional 
frameworks, are likely to be endogenously determined at the country level, and thus they should 
also be considered as components of the national tax effort. Unfortunately, the information 
available at the sub-national government level is, in general, still very limited, so the 
econometric analysis tends to be more informative at the international level. Moreover, even in 
that case, the data available for Latin American countries are quite incomplete, which naturally 
limits the validity of our results. Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel of nine countries 
with years of observation covering the period 1990-2007.  
We suggest that the improvement of property tax collections and the realization of 
effective revenue autonomy may require, paradoxically, a more active involvement of the central 
government in the implementation, administration and collection of the property tax. The central 
governments in the region might provide technical and financial assistance to the less 
administratively developed local governments, and in some cases might temporarily retain some 
responsibilities over different aspects of this revenue source. In addition, the central government 
could contribute by helping to strengthen the relationship between autonomy and accountability 
at the sub-national level, and by redesigning the intergovernmental transfer systems in a way that 
does not provide incentives to reduce sub-national own tax collections. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview 
of the main characteristics and importance of the property tax in Latin America. In section three 
we evaluate the property tax in terms of the desirable properties of a good sub-national tax. In 
section four we develop an analytical framework in which we identify the determining factors of 
tax collection performance of sub-national governments. This analytical framework provides a 
sounder basis for the comparison of performances of sub-national governments within a country 
and across different countries, where performance is measured on the basis of actual revenue 
                                                          
1
 The taxation of property comes in many different modalities and within each one of them different approaches 
have been used in the international practice, all of which offer different advantages and disadvantages. Many of 
these are reviewed in Bird and Slack (2004) and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008a, and forthcoming). 
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collections vis-à-vis the potential collections reflected by existing fiscal capacities. In section 
five we present the empirical analysis. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Property taxation in Latin America 
 
Despite the generally accepted potential of property taxes in tax systems all over the world, 
in practice they are a minor source of public revenues, specially by comparison to other taxes 
also commonly used worldwide such as income taxes or the VAT or sales taxes. The property 
tax is especially far from being a mainstay of the revenue system in developing and transitional 
countries.  
To put the performance of property taxes in Latin America into perspective, we compare 
it with the performance of other regions of the world. As shown in Table 1, property taxes in 
developing and transitional countries raise less revenue relative to GDP than OECD countries. In 
the early 2000s property taxes in OECD countries represented 2.12 percent of GDP, while for 
developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent and, for transition countries, 0.68 percent. The 
trend for revenues in all three groups of countries has been slightly upwards since the 1970s.  
The figures in Table 1 suggest that the overall performance of the property tax in terms of GDP 
is associated with the level of economic development; for example, OECD countries rely more 
on the property tax than do developing countries. However, that relationship is not necessarily 
monotonic and Latin American countries are found to perform less well than the average 
developing country. 
 
Table 1. The property tax as a share of GDP in representative groups of countries (percent) 
 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s* 
All countries 0.77 0.73 0.75 1.04 
(number of countries) (37) (49) (59) (65) 
OECD countries 1.24 1.31 1.44 2.12 
(number of countries) (16) (18) (16) (18) 
Transition countries 0.34 0.59 0.54 0.68 
(number of countries) (1) (4) (20) (18) 
Developing countries 0.42 0.36 0.42 0.60 
(number of countries) (20) (27) (23) (29) 
Latin American countries … … 0.36 0.37 
(number of countries) … … (8) (10) 
* The data for 2000s is for five years from 2000 to 2004.   
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent the number of countries considered in each computation. 
Source: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and ECLAC. 
 
Table 2 presents the measures of property tax performance for some Latin American 
countries. Even though the reliance on the property tax is low, there is still a significant degree of 
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variation across countries. For example, in Peru property tax revenues in recent years (2005-07) 
represent 0.16 percent of GDP, while in Bolivia for the same period that figure is about four 
times larger, at 0.62 percent of GDP. There is no clear trend over time but on average the relative 
importance of property taxes has decreased over time. There are also some cases where property 
tax performance has consistently increased over time, like in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Guatemala; while in Mexico property taxes have represented 0.18 percent of GDP, without 
changing since the early 1990s.  
 
Table 2. Reliance on the property tax as a share of GDP in Latin American countries  
 
  1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Argentina  0.65 0.62 0.59 0.44 
Bolivia  … … 0.69 0.62 
Brazil  0.37 0.41 0.42 0.44 
Chile 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.59 
Colombia 0.25 0.46 0.48 0.54 
Ecuador 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 
Guatemala 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.16 
Mexico 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Paraguay … 0.36 0.39 … 
Peru … … 0.17 0.16 
Uruguay 0.52 0.70 0.71 … 
Latin American countries 0.33 0.40 0.38 0.36 
Source: ECLAC. 
 
Central to this paper is the question of which factors may help explain variations in the 
use of property taxes in Latin America. It seems quite certain that property taxes remain the great 
unrealized promise for local tax autonomy in Latin America. Like in some other regions of the 
world, the yield of the property tax remains lower than its potential; but in Latin America the 
distance between potential and reality appears to be much larger. The reasons we explore in this 
paper are multiple, including low political will and disincentive effects of revenue sharing and 
transfers, and outdated and poorly equipped tax administrations. These factors would seem to 
translate into generous exemptions and low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value 
assessments, incomplete registries and cadastres and lack of willingness and means of enforcing 
collections.  
This lackluster performance of property taxes in Latin America and the differences 
observed among countries are likely to be related to the different arrangements for discretion on 
rate setting or administration of the property tax. Some of the main institutional features in the 
assignment and administration of the property tax across Latin American countries are presented 
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in Appendix I.
2
 For the most part, Latin American countries assign the property tax to municipal 
governments, although there are “full” exceptions like in the case of the Dominican Republic 
where this tax remains a central tax, and “partial” exceptions where some authority over taxes 
remains at the central level (e.g., Brazil for rural taxes, Guatemala, and Panama) or at the 
provincial level (Argentina). In most cases, municipalities are also given some authority to 
change tax rates, at times within legislated limits, but here there are also exceptions. For 
example, Chile does not give that authority to the municipalities and the states or provinces in 
Mexico and Argentina also share in that authority. For the administration of the tax, the central 
governments (the provinces in the case of Argentina) are most frequently responsible for 
updating the cadastre; in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico the cadastre is a municipal function. 
In terms of assigning the responsibility for billing and collections there is a large variety of 
practices with these functions at times exclusively assigned to the central or municipal 
governments and other times these functions are shared by different levels of government. 
Finally, the predominant approach to the assessment of properties is market valuation.  
A priori, we can theorize on the positive and negative aspects of the assignment of 
specific functions vis-à-vis the revenue productivity of property taxes. For example, the 
assignment of administrative functions at the municipal level may have certain advantages, such 
as better information about the properties and potentially stronger incentives to collect taxes, but 
the central authorities might also have advantages, such as better skilled and remunerated 
officials and stronger authority to make things happen. In the next section we explore in more 
depth the role of property taxation in financing local governments and the advantages and 
disadvantages of different administrative schemes. Ultimately, we will rely on our empirical 
analysis to discern the direction and statistical significance of the different administrative 
arrangements on tax collections from the property tax. 
 
3. The role of property taxation on local government financing 
 
There is a widespread agreement among economists and policymakers about the 
appropriateness and convenience of assigning the property tax to local governments. Indeed, 
while the theoretical normative analyses developed in the economic literature suggest that the 
property tax is a good source of local government revenue, in practice most of the decentralized 
economies in the world have assigned, at least partially, the responsibility over the property tax 
to local governments. This matching of theory and practice, however, does not imply that the 
decentralization of the property tax has always been carried out in accordance with the normative 
prescriptions developed in the economic literature. In many cases, either because of the 
difficulties associated with its implementation, or because of poorly designed incentives, the 
property tax has not become a significant source of revenues. 
                                                          
2
 For a detailed description of property tax systems in Latin America, see De Cesare and Lazo Marín (2008). 
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The economic role currently assigned to property taxation has been shaped by a vast and 
longstanding literature analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative tax revenue 
sources. In this section we briefly describe the economic arguments used to recommend the 
property tax as one of the major sources of own local government revenues. We start by 
discussing the general characteristics of good tax revenue sources, in general and at the local 
level, and then we briefly stress the importance of tax revenue autonomy in a decentralized 
system of government. 
 
3.1  A preliminary evaluation of sub -national property taxation  
Tax policy is carried out in complex environments where institutional, cultural, political, and 
economic variables interact in order to determine not only the economic effects of certain tax 
instruments, but also their feasibility as policy tools. In reality, there are no easy answers 
regarding the desirability of one tax instrument over another, and economists usually rely on a 
set of widely accepted criteria or principles in order to describe a “good tax” and evaluate the 
appropriateness of alternative tax instruments. Among the most commonly used principles we 
find the following: 
 Efficiency: A tax should not induce significant behavioral responses of individuals and 
firms; or in other words, it should not distort the adequate allocation of resources in the 
economy. When taxpayers bear their burden in accordance with the benefit they receive 
(that is, when the “benefit principle” is fulfilled) then the tax approximates the role of a user 
fee and is considered as an efficient tax. Indeed, the behavioral responses induced by 
(rightly set) user fees can be interpreted as the result of a correcting incentive (similar to 
what happens in private markets), because the adjustment in the behavior of the individual 
or the firm is made in order to pay the correct price of the public good. 
 Equity and fairness: The principle of horizontal equity calls for (or regards as fair) an equal 
treatment of taxpayers in identical conditions. In contrast, the concept of vertical equity 
allows for several possible arrangements in which a tax can be said to be regressive, 
proportional or progressive as long as the tax burden increases in a lower, equal or higher 
proportion with the ability to pay. The ability to pay principle states that taxpayers with 
greater ability to pay should bear a greater tax burden, but the judgment on what is to be 
considered fair is a matter to be solved by each community or society. In any case, in order 
to become a good revenue source, a tax should be considered fair by the taxpayers. 
 Revenue adequacy: A tax should raise a significant amount of revenues relative to the costs 
of collection and expenditure needs of a government. In addition, the tax base should be 
stable and rather insensitive to cyclical fluctuations. 
 Low costs of administration and compliance: Administration costs reduce the share of tax 
collections available to finance public goods and services. Similarly, compliance costs 
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reduce the share of taxpayers‟ income available for private consumption. If these costs are 
relatively high then other tax revenue sources might be preferable.  
 Political acceptability: A tax that is not acceptable either to the taxpayers or to a significant 
portion of the political class might simply be impossible to implement. Even if it is 
implemented, in order to be successful, a tax requires a high degree of cooperation of all 
relevant agents and institutions. Failing to reach this cooperation might result in low 
voluntary compliance, inadequate or unrealistic laws, and deficient enforcement. 
 Minimize tax avoidance and tax evasion. A tax should not induce significant, legal or 
illegal, efforts to elude the tax burden. Both types of responses erode the tax base, create 
deviations from the targeted incidence, distort the relative prices in the economy and might 
aggravate problems in horizontal and vertical equity.  
 
No tax instrument perfectly fulfills all these principles nor could it be considered as 
superior to all alternative tax instruments in all conditions. In reality, although these principles of 
taxation serve as a guide to describe the characteristics of a “good” tax instrument, they must be 
evaluated in the specific context where a tax is implemented. A general evaluation of the 
property tax, therefore, can be expected to lead to different conclusions depending on its 
structure, whether the property tax is assigned to the central government or to the local 
governments, and so on.  
Table 3 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of assigning the property 
tax to the central or to the local governments. 
3
 Local governments have an advantage in terms of 
economic efficiency because their proximity to the taxpayers allows them to better fulfill the 
benefit principle. Indeed, the central government is more subject to the “common pool problem,” 
by which those who contribute to financing the public goods (the country as a whole if the tax is 
assigned to the center) are not necessarily the beneficiaries of public expenditures. In general, the 
lower the size of the jurisdiction and the greater the share of the property tax on local revenues, 
the greater the ability of local governments to use property taxation as a benefit tax. 
The central government seems to have a clear advantage in terms of the ability to address 
the problems of horizontal and vertical equity and fairness. Since Musgrave (1959) the economic 
literature distinguishes macroeconomic stability, an equitable distribution of income and the 
efficient allocation of resources as the three fundamental economic objectives of the (general) 
government, and broadly accepts that local involvement should be restricted only (or mostly) to 
contribute to the objective of allocation efficiency. The reason is that local authorities cannot 
consider the macroeconomic consequences of their decisions, neither are they capable of, nor 
interested in, ensuring fairness in the national context. According to this argument, local 
governments should not even intervene in redistributive policies within their own jurisdictions,  
                                                          
3
 The advantages of the property tax as a local tax are reviewed, among many others, in Oates (1999), Bird (2006), 
and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008b). 
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Table 3. Comparative analysis of property taxation at the central and local levels of government 
Principle Property tax as a  
Central Government tax 
Property tax as a  
Local Governments‟ tax 
Efficiency Disadvantage: the “common pool 
problem” increases with the size 
of the government. 
Advantage: the property tax 
approximates a user fee, especially 
as the jurisdiction size decreases. 
Equity and fairness  Advantage: both vertical and 
horizontal disparities can be 
addressed at a national level. 
Disadvantage: heterogeneity and 
different tax bases impose unequal 
conditions in different jurisdictions. 
Revenue adequacy Advantage: less mobility and 
variability at the national level. 
Disadvantage: revenues can be more 
volatile in smaller jurisdictions. 
Low administration costs  
 
 
Advantage: better administrative 
and fiscal capacity. 
Disadvantage: economies of scale 
might not be substantial. 
Disadvantage: implementation costs 
might simply be unaffordable. 
Advantage: firsthand knowledge of 
the taxpayers and the tax base. 
Low compliance costs (Depend on the complexity of the system and 
the taxpayers‟ willingness to contribute) 
Political acceptability Disadvantage: the property tax is 
very visible. 
Advantage: visibility helps to link 
taxation with public goods benefits 
and increases accountability. 
Tax compliance Disadvantage: inflexible terms 
and “common good problem” 
reduce willingness to contribute. 
Advantage: closer match of 
taxpayers‟ preferences and better 
knowledge of their ability to pay. 
 
but rather might limit themselves to avoiding worsening the distribution of income at the local 
level.
 4
 This consideration is especially relevant in Latin America, a region where the distribution 
of income is among the worst in the world (Lopez and Perry, 2008). 
5
 
Independently from the relative magnitude of property tax collections, the fact that 
mobility is lower at the national level implies that the property tax collections would be more 
stable for the central government. At the local level individual taxpayers can move out as a 
response to excessive tax rates and lower the market value of properties. Firms might also decide 
to leave the jurisdiction and in that case, in addition to the property value effect, the loss in tax 
collections would be greater if commercial use is taxed more heavily than residential use.  
Due to their potentially significant magnitude, the administration costs play a crucial role 
in determining the ability of a government to adequately implement and collect the property tax. 
In particular, the assessment of property values is complex and requires well prepared personnel; 
building a complete cadastre is a long and expensive task. In this context the central government 
usually has advantages in terms of its ability to finance and develop comprehensive cadastres. 
                                                          
4
 The concept of equity in the distribution of income ultimately deals with who bears the burden of the tax, or the 
incidence of the tax. Zodrow (2008) provides a brief review of the property tax incidence literature. 
5
 Based on an empirical analysis encompassing 34 developing countries and 22 developed countries, Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2010) suggest that the local governments might actually contribute to improving the distribution 
of income. However, this conclusion is subject to a public sector playing a significant role in the economy (more 
than 20% of the GDP), a condition that is not observed in Latin American countries, where total expenditures of the 
general government represent, on average during 2007, less than 15% of the GDP (Penn World Table). 
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Moreover, local authorities in developing countries usually lack the enforcement mechanisms available 
to central governments, such as legal staff, policemen, and other means to take advantage of their 
proximity to tax officials and taxpayers.  
Importantly, local property taxation might also have an advantage in terms of the political 
acceptability. One payment (or a few) per year of a relatively high amount of money makes the 
property tax a visible and an unpopular revenue source. Local authorities are in a better position 
than the central government to show the taxpayers the way in which property tax revenues are 
used to finance public services, and therefore to justify the tax payments as a fair price for the 
benefits received. If local authorities manage to effectively match public service provision with 
the preferences of the community then the taxpayers might well feel inclined to voluntary 
comply with the tax law, reducing the practice of tax evasion. In this sense, an adequate supply 
of public services might provide incentives to taxpayers to remain in the jurisdiction even if tax 
rates are relatively high with respect to neighboring areas. The local authorities also have a better 
knowledge of the taxpayers‟ ability to pay inside the jurisdiction; thus they might be able to 
better monitor and enforce compliance as well as make proper adjustments to the local tax 
policy. Torgler (2005) finds that the size of the informal sector is an important determinant of tax 
compliance in Latin America. The informal sector represents an important share of the economy 
in developing countries, and in Latin America is estimated to be around 41% of the GNP (Alm 
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). The question is whether local governments can exploit their 
advantage of being “closer” to the constituencies in order to bring more activities in the formal 
sector and encourage increased voluntary compliance. Little research has been done on this 
issue.  
In summary, both central and local governments have advantages and disadvantages for 
administering the property tax and it is not possible to assert a priori which level will perform 
better. In practice, however, their strengths can be combined in mixed arrangements of authority 
and responsibilities. On the one hand, the visibility of the property tax, usually considered as a 
disadvantage for the central government, is a key aspect of the problem that calls for a keen 
participation of local authorities in rate setting and also in the administration of the property tax. 
At the local level the tax authorities might be able to use such visibility to present the property 
tax as a benefit tax, enhancing political acceptability and taxpayers‟ participation in local 
decisions, and potentially reducing non compliance. On the other hand, central government 
intervention might be helpful to develop comprehensive cadastres, to assist in the formation of 
administrative capacity and to provide policy parameters within which the creation of 
inefficiencies can be contained.  
The literature has identified a number of additional desirable features of a “good local 
tax.” 6 Among these features we count, again, the correspondence between tax payments and 
                                                          
6
 Discussions about the property tax and the characteristics of a good local tax are discussed, for instance, in McLure 
(1994), McCluskey and Williams (1999), McCluskey and Plimmer (2007), Bahl and Bird (2008) and Martinez-
Vazquez, Noiset and Rider (2010). 
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benefits received (benefit principle), the perception of fairness, and the stability of revenue 
collections. In addition, and pondering some of the arguments provided earlier in this section, the 
visibility of the tax instrument is considered as a good characteristic of local taxation. Other 
desirable features that are applicable specifically within the local context are: 
 The tax base should be relatively immovable: According to the Tiebout‟s (1956) hypothesis, 
taxpayers would “vote with their feet” and efficiently reallocate themselves after 
considering the combination of taxes and services offered by different local governments. In 
practice, however, tax competition among sub-national governments might also lead to a 
“race to the bottom,” if local governments are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to 
retain the taxpayers inside the jurisdiction. As a result, the overall amount of sub-national 
public expenditures may remain at a sub-optimal level.
7
 A consensual, but rather 
conservative, position to deal with the unclear effects of mobility in economic efficiency 
consists of assuming that any fiscally-induced change in taxpayers‟ behavior represents a 
distortion of the efficient allocation of resources in the economy and consequently reduces 
economic welfare. Moreover, it is clear that a relatively immovable tax base would allow for 
more room in tax policy decisions.  
 The tax should be geographically neutral: Taxes should not interfere with the commercial 
flow of goods and services and business location decisions across the jurisdictions. In this 
case we again assume that tax-induced changes of taxpayers‟ behavior should be avoided. 
 Taxes should not be easily exported: The benefit principle does not hold if non-residents are 
charged for the provision of local services. In addition, such a situation implies that the costs 
assumed locally are reduced, which might also lead to over-provision of public services. 
 Significant tax revenue sources should be evenly distributed among jurisdictions: Sizeable 
variations in the size of the tax base create high fiscal disparities among jurisdictions and 
impose undesirable differences in the degree of revenue autonomy. In general, local 
governments with more (less) revenue autonomy are also able to exert more (less) discretion 
in their expenditure decisions, and this might translate into greater (lower) ability to tailor 
the public service provision to the preferences of the community. Great differences in the 
size of the tax base, therefore, might generate discontent and even confusion regarding the 
importance of own revenue collections and, in general, the role of local governments in a 
decentralized system. 
The extent to which these conditions hold, or are adhered to in practice, is likely to vary 
from one tax instrument to another. In general, it seems reasonable to expect that only some 
taxes, if any, will satisfy all of them. For instance, there are few taxes that satisfy the benefit 
principle and are not exportable, among which the property tax and the tax on vehicles stand as 
the most typical examples. However, both the property tax and the tax on vehicles are subject to 
                                                          
7
 Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that tax competition has a corrective effect on the overall amount of public 
expenditures, because it limits the natural tendency of governments to spend more than the efficient amount. 
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tax competition, which can create economic inefficiencies and erode the tax bases. In addition, in 
most cases the magnitude of the tax base varies significantly across jurisdictions, particularly 
between urban and rural areas. In this sense, we can also expect a certain degree of correlation 
between the size of the tax base and the administrative capacity of the local government, such 
that the initial disparities are aggravated by the relative difficulties in raising local revenues. 
All things considered, the property tax represents a promising but still imperfect source of 
own revenues at the local level. Even with significant decentralization of the property tax, poorer 
local governments will likely remain dependent on alternative sources of revenues, notably 
intergovernmental transfers. In addition, special attention will be required to create a tradition of 
taxpayers‟ participation and voluntary compliance, and to provide the right incentives for 
efficient levels of tax effort by local governments. 
 
3.2  The importance of tax revenue autonomy  
The Decentralization Theorem (Oates 1972) states that if the decisions about the type and 
amount of public goods are allowed to be made locally, then the level of social welfare would be 
greater with respect to a situation where public goods are centrally, and uniformly, determined 
for all localities. The reason is simply that the local governments are better able to tailor public 
goods provision to the particular needs and preferences of each jurisdiction.
8
 
In order to adapt the type and amount of public goods to the local needs and preferences 
the local authorities require, by necessity, a certain degree of autonomy on their expenditure 
decisions. But even if granted by law, the expenditure autonomy cannot be practiced without 
sufficient technical and administrative capacity and the ability to discretionally increase the 
amount of local revenues. The existence of effective expenditure and revenue autonomy is 
widely recognized in the literature as a basic requirement for realizing the welfare gains of fiscal 
decentralization. Unfortunately, this economic prescription does not always concur, and might 
even collide with, the practical drivers of decentralization. The international movement towards 
greater fiscal decentralization has responded more to political forces like the demand for deeper 
democratization, the resolution of ethnic conflicts, or the failure of central governments in 
securing national objectives, than to a search for greater economic efficiency as portrayed in the 
Decentralization Theorem.
9
 In many countries the implementation of an economically efficient 
decentralization design, although desirable, might well not be a priority.  
According to Ahmad and Brosio (2008), one of the main factors weakening the 
decentralization process in Latin America has been the lack of attention given to the sub-national 
revenue assignments. In this context, it does not seem too audacious to suggest that the 
                                                          
8
 Oates (2006) provides a more recent discussion about the Decentralization Theorem and the channels through 
which fiscal decentralization can lead to net welfare gains for society. 
9
 See Shah (2004) for a discussion about the possible factors explaining the widespread decentralization movement 
among developing and transition countries. 
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widespread decentralization of the property tax is partially explained by the fact that the central 
authorities have several more efficient, easier to administer, and less unpopular revenue sources 
under their control. Similarly, central authorities are usually reluctant to devolve effective 
autonomy to the sub-national governments in most areas of taxation. The reason for this may be 
the lack of technical and administrative capacity at the sub-national level, but it is also 
reasonable to presume that central authorities are not willing to renounce their power over 
budgetary decisions.  
In short, even though the choice of the property tax as a main source of local own 
revenues seems to be correct from an economic perspective, the assignment of this revenue 
source to the local governments by no means guarantees that local governments will be able to 
exert expenditure autonomy in the margin and to realize the benefits of decentralization.  
 
4. Explaining property tax collections: An analytical framework  
 
The amount of property tax revenues that governments are able to collect varies widely 
across nations and across jurisdictions within any country, and it depends on a wide range of 
institutional, cultural, political and economic factors. The problem of property tax collections (or 
the lack thereof) has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature. The complexities of 
the problem and data limitations, however, still impose severe restrictions to the empirical 
analyses; and as a result, no conclusive answers have been reached about the factors determining 
property tax collections.  
In this section we develop a model of property tax collections and show their dependency 
on the concept of tax effort, and explain how the design and implementation of the fiscal 
decentralization process can affect the performance of the property tax. We begin by presenting a 
general model of revenue collections and then we analyze, separately, the revenue collection 
problem at the sub-national and national levels. 
 
4.1 A simple model of property tax collections  
Following Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008), and assuming that the property value assessment 
is based on market value, the amount of property tax collections (  ) can be defined as: 10  
     
  
  
 
  
   
 
   
   
 
   
  
     ,      (1) 
                                                          
10
 In the equality provided by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) both sides of the identity are divided by the GDP. 
By doing this, the tax collections are expressed in relative terms, thus the figures for different countries are 
comparable and the analysis can be carried out in a cross sectional basis. This equality was previously presented, for 
instance, in Bahl (1979). 
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where      : property tax liability, 
      : taxable assessed value, 
     : taxable market value, 
     : full market value. 
The first term on the right hand side, property tax collections over tax liability, corresponds to 
the collection ratio. In the ideal case the amount of tax collections should be identical to the tax 
liabilities and this term would be equal to one. In practice, however, either the tax authorities 
might fail to properly enforce the tax law or the taxpayers might fail to comply with it; thus the 
collection ratio is normally lower than one. The value of the collection ratio can be interpreted as 
a measure of the observance of the tax law and the ability of the authorities to enforce it through 
fines or even jail sentences. According to Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008), a normal value for 
the collection ratio in developing countries is around 50%, which is explained mainly due to lax 
tax enforcement, and in some cases can even be as low as 20%.  
The second term on the right hand side of equation 1, the share of tax liabilities over 
taxable assessed value, is the statutory tax rate, usually set at some value lower than 1%. The 
third term represents the assessment ratio, the share of taxable assessed value on taxable market 
value, by which the law establishes the share of the taxable market value over which the tax 
liability is actually going to be computed. When the assessment ratio is specified by law, then it 
normally takes a value between zero and one, but if it is not specified, then its implicit value is 
one. The assessment ratio is nothing more than an adjustment to the statutory tax rate and it is 
used to induce acceptability of the tax system and reduce complaints about the assessment 
criteria, because it gives the taxpayer the impression that he is not being taxed for the full value 
of his property. 
11
 Finally, the fourth and fifth terms on the right hand side of equation 1 jointly 
represent the tax base (  ) that is actually available for taxation. The fourth term is the ratio of 
taxable market value over (full) market value, and summarizes all the effects of preferential 
treatments, exemptions on the tax base, and errors in assessing the true market value of the 
property (the last term in the equation). Equation 1 can now be rewritten as:  
     
  
  
        ,         (2) 
where    is the statutory tax rate “adjusted” by the assessment ratio.  
As explained, the collection ratio measures the degree of observance of the tax law, and 
can be different from one only in the presence of “distortions” imposed by the behavior of 
government authorities or taxpayers. There are several possible sources of distortions that can 
explain a low degree of observance of the tax law. On the government side, the tax law can be 
deficiently enforced (  ) if the tax authorities are either unable or unwilling to capture the 
                                                          
11
 If the collection ratio is assumed to be set at 1 by the tax authorities, then this term might still have a value 
different from one, which could be interpreted as a deviation of the “true” market value of taxable properties due to 
an inaccurate assessment of the value of taxable properties. In this framework, however, we assume that the market 
value is correctly measured and that the collection ratio serves only as a policy instrument. 
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whole revenue potential of the property tax. We might also be in the presence of corruption ( ), 
in which case the tax authorities appropriate for themselves a share of the revenues collected.  
On the taxpayers‟ side, revenues might be lost due to tax evasion ( ), generally defined 
as any illegal form of taxpayers‟ non-compliance. 12 The traditional model of tax evasion 
explains taxpayers‟ non-compliance by considering the probability of auditing and detection, the 
cost of enforcement and the costs of non-compliance, which can be summarized under the 
concept of penalties ( ). 13 In the case of the property tax, however, illegal non-compliance is 
limited by the very nature of the tax base. If properties are immovable, then they cannot be easily 
hidden from the tax authorities. As a result, tax evasion can take place only under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the taxpayers might take advantage of the inability or unwillingness 
of the tax authorities to correctly assess the value of the property, or might also attempt to lie in 
order to qualify for preferential treatments and exemptions. In these cases the factor explaining 
tax evasion is deficient enforcement. Alternatively, corrupt tax authorities might accept bribes 
for reducing taxpayers‟ tax bills. 
Another possible form of tax evasion consists of simply refusing to pay the tax liabilities. 
This decision would be economically rational and even become a common practice, if taxpayers 
perceive that the tax law is not enforced or if the costs of tax evasion are relatively low. In 
contrast, if the tax law specifies high penalties and is being properly enforced, then tax evasion 
would certainly be too costly and eventually lead to the expropriation of the property; thus it is 
less likely that the taxpayers would choose this strategy. 
The economic literature has recently incorporated the concept of tax morale (  ) in 
order to account for the fact that taxpayers are usually inclined to voluntarily comply with the tax 
law even in the absence of effective enforcement.
14
 Analyzing opinion survey data from the 
United States and Turkey, Torgler et al (2008) find that positive attitudes towards the tax 
authorities and the tax system as well as trust in public officials significantly increase tax morale, 
while the perception of corruption has the opposite effect. Additionally, Torgler (2005a) shows 
that the willingness to pay taxes increases with the level of direct democracy in a jurisdiction. 
The evidence provided by the tax morale literature suggests, therefore, that tax evasion also 
depends on the taxpayers‟ perception about the behavior and performance of the tax authorities, 
and the extent to which they conform to the preferences of the community. In our model we 
summarize these determinants of tax morale with the concepts of corruption and government 
responsiveness ( ). Tax morale is expected to decrease (and tax evasion to increase) with a 
                                                          
12
 The literature reserves the term “tax avoidance” to refer to any legal form of non-compliance. Tax avoidance 
corresponds to the taxpayers‟ initiatives to minimize their tax burden by taking advantage of preferential treatments 
and exemptions contemplated in the law. In this model, tax avoidance is accounted for as a reduction of taxable 
market value of properties, and thus a reduction of the property tax base. 
13
 The basic structure of the tax traditional evasion model is developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Srinivasan (1973), and the cost of enforcement is incorporated by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Two surveys on the 
theory of tax compliance are provided by Andreoni et al (1998) and Sandmo (2005). 
14
 A comprehensive review of the concept of tax morale and the relevant literature is provided by Torgler (2007). 
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higher perception of corruption; and the opposite would occur if the tax authorities are truthfully 
responsive to the preferences of the taxpayers. 
Summarizing, tax evasion can be said to respond positively to deficient enforcement and 
negatively to the size of penalties and tax morale, and we can write in shorthand that   
               . Furthermore, the amount of tax liabilities (  ) can be decomposed into the 
observance of the tax law, represented by tax collections   , and the non-observance of the tax 
law, represented by the tax revenues forgone due to deficient enforcement   , corruption  , and 
tax evasion  : 
                           .      (3) 
Solving this equation for    and dividing by   , we can introduce it into equation 2 to express 
the amount of tax collections as: 
        
  
  
 
 
  
 
            
  
        .    (4) 
where tax collections appear to be a function of deficient enforcement, corruption, penalties of 
tax evasion, government responsiveness, the adjusted statutory tax rate, and the size of the tax 
base. The analytical advantage of equation 4 is that now tax collections are exclusively expressed 
as a function of exogenous variables, which allows us to more easily identify the factors that 
determine the actual amount of tax revenue collections.  
The amount of taxes a government is able to collect largely depends on policy variables 
that can be influenced either by the tax law or by the tax authorities. This conclusion stresses the 
role of the tax laws and the responsible government authorities as opposed to the role of 
taxpayers in explaining tax collections. A government in need of rising additional revenues is not 
limited to legally determining the tax rate and the tax base. In reality, several alternative channels 
might serve the same purpose. For instance, the tax law might incorporate measures to minimize 
and sanction corruption, set adequate levels of penalties for evasion, and restrict preferential 
treatments and exemptions. Alternatively, the tax authorities might choose to effectively enforce 
the tax law, improve the assessment process in order to more accurately measure the tax base, 
and to deepen the involvement of taxpayers in the public spending decisions. As De Cesare 
(2002, p.11) points out in the context of a review of several independent experiences in Latin 
America, “…it [is] clear that the political will is the principal element for explaining differences 
in the performance of property taxes.” 
So far the discussion about the basic determinants of tax collections has not distinguished 
between the levels of government responsible to collect the property tax. This distinction is 
important because different levels of government are given different responsibilities and decision 
making powers, and also because typically they possess dissimilar levels of administrative 
capacity. In principle, the more discretion a sub-national government is allowed, the greater the 
influence it can exert on the variables determining the amount of tax collections. In any case, 
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equation 4 also shows that even with limited power over the design of the tax policy a sub-
national government has a wide variety of channels available to alter the amount of tax 
collections. Indeed, due to their proximity to the collection process and to the taxpayers, the sub-
national authorities could enjoy some advantages with respect to the central government. 
Corruption, for instance, might be easier to detect and correct at the local level; and 
strengthening the enforcement of the law and reducing tax evasion might well be facilitated by 
enhancing the taxpayers‟ participation in local expenditure decisions. Although not conclusive, 
the economic literature provides some evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization reduces 
the level of corruption in a country. When authorities enjoy a significant degree of autonomy 
they not only have more ability to correct the distortions that reduce the level of tax collections, 
but they also are more accountable to the community. 
15
 
 
4.2 Comparing tax collection performance at the sub -national 
level  
A sub-national government responsible for collecting certain taxes would likely have some 
degree of discretion over several, and maybe all, of the explanatory variables described in 
equation 4. In this context, tax performance can be evaluated by comparing the amount of taxes 
collected by different sub-national government under similar conditions. A good (poor) level of 
performance would consist of collecting a relatively high (low) amount of tax revenues with 
respect to other sub-national governments that face a comparable tax base and enjoy a similar 
level of discretion.  
The natural question is what amount of tax collections should be considered as the 
benchmark to distinguish between good and poor performance. In principle, for each level of 
government, the total amount of revenues raised should be able to cover all the expenditure 
needs. Therefore, in a decentralized system of government the benchmarking amount of tax 
collections can be defined, jointly for all tax instruments available, as the share of expenditure 
needs that remain unfunded after the vertical imbalance has been corrected via intergovernmental 
transfers. Unfortunately, this benchmark requires a precise measure of the vertical imbalance, 
which in practice is difficult to obtain. A more feasible alternative is to set the benchmark at the 
average effective tax rate,   , such that any government whose effective tax rate is higher (lower) 
than the average would be said to exert a relatively high (low) tax effort.
16
  
                                                          
15
 See, for instance, Fisman and Gatti (2002) for an empirical analysis providing strong support to the hypothesis 
that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption. 
16
    can be computed as the total amount of taxes actually collected among all government units divided by the 
overall tax base. This definition corresponds to the weighted average of the effective tax rate for all government 
units. A different alternative, not less convenient, consists of computing the benchmark as the simple average of the 
effective tax rates for the available sample (of countries or sub-national governments). The weighted average will be 
expected to be greater (smaller) than the simple average as long as per capita collections tend to increase (decrease) 
with the jurisdiction size. 
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Now we can multiply both the numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of 
equation 4 by   , and rewrite the equation to describe the tax collections of any jurisdiction   as: 
         
  
   
 
   
   
 
                 
   
  
  
 
    
         .   (5) 
Notice that   and    are the only variables not determined inside the jurisdiction. In general, the 
tax law assigns different responsibilities to the different levels of government, and authority over 
variables like the penalties of tax evasion might be reserved to the central government or even be 
an exclusive prerogative of the congress. Because of this reason the penalties of tax evasion as 
well as any policy variables that are not under the authority of sub-national governments can be 
considered to be determined exogenously. 
On the right hand side of equation 5, the product of the terms inside the bracket and the 
ratio of adjusted statutory tax rate over the average (benchmark) effective tax rate represents a 
“relative effective tax rate,” which takes a value greater than, equal to or lower than one as long 
as the tax rate effectively applied on the government unit   is greater, equal or lower than the 
sample average. This is precisely the definition of what the economic literature refers to as the 
tax effort (  ) exerted by a particular government. Moreover, the product of the last two terms 
in the equation, the average (benchmark) effective tax rate times the tax base of the government 
unit  , describes the concept of fiscal capacity (  ), which is usually defined as the amount of 
tax revenues that could be collected if a given level of effort were applied to the available tax 
base. Equation 5 can therefore be reduced to the following identity: 
             ,         (6) 
where the taxes collected by a government   are defined as the amount of revenues obtained by 
applying the level of effort exerted by that government to a “fair” measure of its potential tax 
revenues.  
By expressing the amount of tax collections as a function of the level of tax effort, 
equation 6 stresses the fact that, given the size of the available tax base, and a certain degree of 
fiscal autonomy, each sub-national government is largely responsible for the amount of taxes 
actually collected within its jurisdiction. In this sense, tax effort is a choice variable that can be 
altered by voluntary decisions of sub-national authorities and those of taxpayers, and therefore it 
can be used as a measure of tax collection performance. Equation 6 implies that we can estimate 
the tax effort of a sub-national government as the ratio of its actual tax collections over its fiscal 
capacity: 
      
   
   
 .          (7) 
In order to evaluate the performance of each sub-national government we only need to compare 
its tax effort with the tax effort of the other sub-national governments of the same level. 
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Moreover, since data about sub-national revenue collections are usually available for most 
countries, the main challenge lies in estimating fiscal capacity. 
A correct interpretation of the concept of tax effort requires a careful consideration of the 
actual degree of fiscal autonomy enjoyed in each jurisdiction. If all sub-national governments 
enjoy the same degree of (significant) fiscal autonomy, then a relatively high (low) level of fiscal 
effort might simply suggest that the jurisdiction‟s residents are demanding a relatively large 
(small) amount of sub-national services. Given that the efficiency gains of fiscal decentralization 
arise from tailoring the provision of public services to the needs and preferences of each 
community, then even a very low level of tax effort could be regarded as optimal. Indeed, if the 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is properly functioning then there would be nothing 
right (wrong) with a high (low) level of tax effort, and no reward (penalty) would be justified. In 
practice, however, and especially in the initial states of a fiscal decentralization reform, sub-
national fiscal autonomy might be limited by several factors. For instance, there might not be a 
longstanding tradition of taxpayers‟ contributions to the public sector, and thus taxpayers might 
not be willing to voluntarily comply with the law and neither would the tax authorities be willing 
to enforce it. Decentralization reform, in this sense, can actually imply a radical cultural change 
for some communities. Another limitation, very common among poor jurisdictions, is that of the 
lack of technical and administrative capacity to manage sub-national finances and collect the 
taxes. A sub-national government cannot be expected to assess the tax base, compute the tax 
liability and collect the taxes without proper means to carry out these functions. But this basic 
contradiction is a rather common occurrence among sub-national governments in Latin America, 
especially in the rural areas. In order to address this problem either an asymmetric 
decentralization of public functions or central government assistance to develop adequate 
capacity would be required.  
Given that the factors limiting sub-national fiscal autonomy usually unevenly affect 
different jurisdictions, the observed variations in tax effort and performance may no longer be 
the result of sub-national choices. It follows that in order to make the sub-national authorities 
(and the communities) fully liable for the differences in tax effort then they should enjoy equal, 
or at least comparable, levels of effective fiscal autonomy. 
In spite of this argument, in order to increase own revenue collections, some countries 
decide to reward high tax effort with additional intergovernmental transfers, and sanction low tax 
effort with no additional, or less, intergovernmental transfers. These incentives might serve as an 
effective tool to encourage greater sub-national tax collections, but it is important to recognize 
that they would plausibly lead to counterproductive results. The reason for this is very simple 
and deals with the trade-off faced at the sub-national level between own revenue sources and 
intergovernmental transfers. Assuming that there are no savings, the total amount of government 
expenditures in public services ( ) is equal to own tax collections plus the amount received in 
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the form of intergovernmental transfers ( ),17 thus for any sub-national government   we can 
write the budget constraint as: 
           ,         (8) 
from which it is clear that sub-national expenditures can be expressed as a function of 
intergovernmental transfers,          . Replacing     by its definition in equation 6, dividing 
by fiscal capacity     and solving for the level of tax effort    , we find that: 
      
         
   
 ,         (9) 
such that the tax effort exerted by the sub-national government   is equal to the difference 
between the total amount of public expenditures and the intergovernmental transfers received, 
over the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction. In other words, tax effort corresponds to the extent to 
which a sub-national government exhausts its own tax base. 
According to equation 9 the direct effect of intergovernmental transfers, with a negative 
sign, is to reduce tax effort. An additional effect, however, can be observed in the amount of 
public goods and services provided. Considering fiscal capacity as exogenous, the net effect of 
transfers on tax effort will depend on whether public expenditures will increase in a greater, 
equal or lower proportion than the transfers received. As a consequence, the final effect of 
intergovernmental transfers on tax effort will ultimately depend on the elasticity of public goods 
provision with respect to a marginal increase of the sub-national budget. Jurisdictions where 
public goods are elastic will respond to additional intergovernmental transfers by increasing the 
level of tax effort, but those where public goods are inelastic, or comparatively less desirable, 
will reduce their tax effort.
18
 This implies that, regardless of the level of fiscal autonomy of sub-
national governments, tax effort can certainly be affected by intergovernmental transfers. 
 This analysis might suggest that the final effect of intergovernmental transfers on tax 
effort is efficient in the sense that it responds to the demand of public services within each 
jurisdiction. However, this conclusion is not necessarily correct. The demand for public services 
is affected by preferences and also by the quality of public services, and in turn this quality can 
be expected to vary across jurisdictions. 
19
 Some local governments might not be able to provide 
public services with desirable standards of quality, which would reduce their demand and the 
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 Other sources of own revenue collections (e.g. fees and financial debt) are excluded, without loss of generality, in 
order to simplify the analysis. Here we also disregard whether the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked or not, 
but this does not alter the fact that any degree of discretion over own revenue collections translates into discretion 
“in the margin” over the total amount of government expenditures. 
18
 As a corollary of this result we could say that if intergovernmental transfers increase, do not change, or decrease 
tax effort in a jurisdiction, then the demand for public goods within that jurisdiction has been revealed to be elastic, 
have unitary elasticity, or be inelastic. 
19
 Equation 10 corresponds to a strictly budgetary identity, but it can be modified in order to model the supply and 
demand for sub-national public goods and services. The left hand side would have to incorporate a production 
function describing the amount and quality of public goods and services, and in the right hand side the tax 
collections would represent the willingness to pay for these outputs. 
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resultant level of tax effort. The obvious equity problems that arise will have to be solved in 
accordance with the national preferences for redistribution. 
 
4.3 Estimating fiscal capacity of sub -national governments  
For the most part, the empirical literature on the property tax has focused on measuring tax effort 
at the sub-national level by considering fiscal capacity as an exogenous factor with respect to the 
tax revenue performance of those sub-national units. The reason for this is that any exercise of 
discretion implies a certain degree of responsibility and thus allows us to evaluate tax 
performance on the basis of effective power over tax collections. In this sense, sub-national 
governments are by presumption passive with respect to their fiscal capacity and this concept can 
be regarded as irrelevant for performance evaluations. 
In the previous discussion we showed, however, that a good measure of fiscal capacity is 
critical to accurately estimate the tax effort and evaluate their tax performance. Measuring the 
fiscal capacity with respect to the property tax is particularly difficult because of the great 
financial, technical and administrative requirements for developing comprehensive cadastres of 
immovable properties. Any measure other than the cadastre, and independent from the actual 
value of properties, will provide a questionable estimation of the potential property tax base. 
Unfortunately, developing countries struggle with the complexity and costs associated 
with the construction of the cadastre, but still the prospect of not taxing properties seems to be a 
much worse solution. In practice, the use of indirect methodologies for estimating the fiscal 
capacity associated with the property tax can help to partially solve this problem. The literature 
has described a number of these methodologies, which have been designed to do as much as the 
availability of information allows.  
One of the simplest methodologies consists of using historical property tax collections 
from one or several past periods. This methodology assumes that past collections can be 
representative of the fiscal capacity of local governments. However, there are several factors that 
might create a difference between potential and actual tax collections. The presence of centrally 
imposed exemptions eroding the tax base, or greater administrative and compliance costs, and 
the taxpayers‟ willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods, are some examples of 
factors that might truly reduce fiscal disparities. But historically low tax collections might also 
be caused by inefficiency, political favors and corruption. In this context, it is desirable to have 
some information about the determinants of fiscal capacity. For instance, we might expect that 
measures of income, production or consumption could be related to the size of the tax base, 
including the property tax base. In general, the use of this type of “proxies” is preferable to the 
use of historical data, but in developing countries we can rarely count on this information at the 
local level. 
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There are several additional methodologies for estimating fiscal capacity and their 
usefulness, of course, depend on whether the data is available or not. 
20
 In any case, it is 
important to stress the fact that deficient measures of fiscal capacity lead, necessarily, to equally 
deficient estimates of tax effort. 
 
4.4 Comparing tax collection performance across countries  
The comparison of property tax performance across countries follows the same logic as the 
comparison of sub-national tax performance. Maybe the most important difference consists of 
which institutions are ultimately responsible for the relative variations in tax performance. In the 
analysis of sub-national tax collections, sub-national governments are responsible for their 
performance up to the point where they do not have further discretion to affect tax collections. 
Such a limit is imposed, for instance, by the tax law, which can usually be regarded as exogenous 
for any sub-national government and even for the central government. In contrast, regardless of 
which level of government is responsible for administering a tax source, at the country level the 
tax law and the public policies in general should be considered as endogenous and other national 
institutions like the congress and the judiciary system also become responsible for the resultant 
level of national tax performance. 
In this cross country context, most of the variables determining property tax collections 
can be considered to be endogenous, and we can define the total amount of tax collections for 
any country   as: 
         
   
   
 
  
   
 
                   
   
    
      ,    (10) 
where besides the change in subscripts the only difference with respect to the sub-national case is 
that the penalties for tax evasion (as well as any other determinant that might be exogenously 
imposed by the tax law) are expressed as endogenous (choice) variables. 
21
 
Moreover, provided the market value of all land and structures (  ) available for taxation 
in the national territory, a country has full discretion to define the tax base, and in this sense the 
share of the tax base over    becomes by itself a component of the national tax effort. As a 
consequence, the country has discretion over all the variables in the right hand side of the 
equation, and tax effort can be defined simply as: 
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 For a review and an extensive discussion about the alternative methodologies available to measure fiscal capacity 
see, for instance, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) and United States Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (1986). 
21
 One might argue that foreign tax policies also affect tax collections because they can induce the taxpayers to 
emigrate in order to capitalize on tax advantages. This is especially relevant in cases where taxpayers are very 
mobile, like corporations. In any case, mobility is fully accounted for in this equation by a decrease in the size of the 
tax base. Another way in which foreign tax policies may also affect tax collections is through spatial tax competition 
across countries. In this case tax rates and other policies set in foreign countries can affect the tax policy choice in 
any one country. 
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 .          (11) 
This equation states that national tax effort can be estimated as the ratio between actual tax 
collections and the market value of lands and structures available for taxation within a country, 
while the last term determines the potential tax collections or fiscal capacity of the country. In 
turn, cross-country comparisons can be carried out by simply comparing the values of national 
tax effort. 
Of course, the same as in the case of sub-national tax performance, the main challenge 
with estimating national tax effort is measuring the fiscal capacity of the country. If this is 
possible, however, the cross-country analysis of tax effort and performance offers important 
advantages in terms of data availability, because much more data about institutional, political, 
cultural and economic variables are available at the country level. 
Given that each country defines its own property tax base and might use different 
valuation methods to estimate the taxable tax base, a wide variation of financial and technical 
arrangements can be observed among different countries. As a consequence, even if available, 
national estimates of the property tax base are not comparable. Bahl and Wallace (2008) suggest 
a standardized approach in order to solve this problem: The measures of national wealth 
provided by the World Bank (2006) can be used to estimate the size of the potential property tax 
base under a single criterion and for a large number of countries. In Appendix II we present the 
estimates of the potential property tax bases for a number of the Latin American countries. 
Unfortunately, the measures of national wealth are currently available only for the year 2000; 
thus even if useful, they do not provide information about how tax bases vary across time. In the 
next section we use these estimates in the econometric analysis of international property tax 
performance. 
 
5. The determinants of property tax collections in Latin-America 
 
An empirical test of the main propositions of our analysis requires information that, in 
general, is not available at the sub-national level in Latin American countries, so we are not able 
to properly account for the determinants of property tax collections at the within-country level. 
For this reason, we begin with a simple OLS regression analysis in order to verify how 
intergovernmental transfers received by local governments in Brazil and Peru (in national 
currency) are correlated with per capita property tax collections. 
22
 
The results are presented in Table 4. Because of data availability, we are able to include 
only a few other control variables to get a clearer picture of the potential impact of 
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 The choice of these countries responds to data availability. Both Brazil and Peru provide public information about 
sub-national finances and basic demographic and development indicators. The main data sources are the National 
Treasure of Brazil and the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru. 
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intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These control variables are the total 
amount of current revenues in each jurisdiction, revenue autonomy (defined as own taxes over 
total revenues), population, regional GDP in the case of Brazil, and the relative incidence of 
poverty and the percent of urban population in the case of Peru. We should also note that total 
current revenues and revenue autonomy should be expected to be endogenous with property tax 
collections; however, lacking valid instruments we cannot correct this problem. Still, a few 
interesting observations may be drawn from the results. 
The most relevant result in Table 4 is that current intergovernmental transfers per capita 
are negatively and significantly correlated with property tax collections per capita in Brazil and 
Peru. This would seem to suggest that on average current transfers act as a disincentive for 
property tax collections. However, we need to interpret this result with caution. There may be an 
endogeneity bias in these estimates because lower property tax revenues per capita may also 
induce larger current intergovernmental transfers per capita. On the other hand, the coefficients 
of capital intergovernmental transfers are not statiscally significant, suggesting that the 
distribution of this revenue source because of its unpredictability or periodicity does not affect 
local property tax collection performance. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Property Tax Collections in Brazil and Peru 
Dependent variable: Per capita property tax collections 
 
 OLS regression 
Brazil 
OLS regression 
Peru 
     
Current transfers per capita -0.1124 *** -0.2263 *** 
 (0.0237)  (0.0130) 
Capital transfers per capita 0.0058  -0.0080  
 (0.0063)  (0.0191) 
Current revenues  per capita 0.1081 *** 0.2165 *** 
 (0.0223)  (0.0123)  
Revenue autonomy (%) 2.5051 *** 1.6772 *** 
 (64.9611)  (49.8014)  
Per capita GDP (2000) -0.0006 **  
 (0.0003)   
Poverty   0.0097  
   (0.0427)  
Urban population (%)   -0.1065 *** 
   (0.0390)  
Population (thousands) -0.0015  -0.1159 *** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0439) 
Constant -8.7593 *** 6.6278  
 (3.3112)  (4.0486)  
     
Observations 4,998  1,428 
     
R-squared 0. 5218  0.8769 
     
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors of in parentheses.  
 ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
The coefficients of total current revenues and revenue autonomy are positive and 
statistically significant. But these results are expected due to the construction of those variables; 
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by definition the larger the property tax collections the larger will be the amount of current 
revenues as well as the share of own revenues in the local budgets. However, they might also 
suggest, subject again to a possible endogeneity bias, that local governments with larger budgets 
and more revenue autonomy might be better able to collect property taxes. 
The regressions also include proxies for local fiscal capacity, which help to estimate the 
relative size of the property tax base as well as the administrative capacity of local governments. 
The per capita GDP variable is available for Brazilian local governments. Its coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 5% confidence level. This result is contrary to our expectations, as 
long as GDP per capita is expected to be highly correlated with the property tax base; but it could 
also be that a higher GDP per capita signals the availability of other tax bases, such as Brazil‟s 
ISS (local tax on services), which is relatively more important than the property tax in local 
budgets. The availability of other tax sources may push down local efforts to collect the more 
difficult and unpopular property tax.
 23
 However, we must note that the estimated coefficient is 
relatively unimportant in terms of magnitude, implying that property tax collections are not that 
responsive to this factor. In the case of Peru there are no measures of GDP al the local level. 
Instead, we use a measure of poverty defined as the share of the population under the poverty 
line; this variable displays no significant correlation with property taxes. In addition, we consider 
the share of the population living in urban areas, which is expected to be directly related with the 
size of the property tax base.; however, here again the coefficient is instead negative and 
statistically significant, perhaps signaling the availability of other more „convenient‟ revenue 
sources in urban areas. 
Finally, the regressions also include population as a control for the jurisdiction size. In 
both cases the coefficient is negative, but it is significant only for Peruvian municipalities. This 
is somewhat surprising because we would expect to observe economies of scale in property tax 
collections. However, this result might be explained, for instance, by the presence of economies 
of scale in the expenditure side; or alternatively; by a positive correlation between the extent of 
informal properties and the jurisdictional size.  
The empirical analysis of property tax collections at the local level is still subject to very 
important data limitations, and the inability to properly control for other determinants can easily 
lead to significant omitted variable bias. In contrast, even though at the international level the 
data are also limited, there are several additional variables that allow us to control for 
macroeconomic, political and institutional factors that are relevant in determining property tax 
collections. In the end, however, there is a clear tradeoff since using international cross-country 
data is also subject to aggregation biases and omitted country fixed effects.  
The cross-country analysis of the determinants of property tax collections considers 9 
Latin American countries for which relevant data are partially available for the period 1990-
2007. These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, 
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 A similar result is found in the analysis of property tax collections at the international level, which is presented 
later in this section, and where we discuss in more detail about possible interpretations.   
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Paraguay, and Peru. The dependent variable, property tax collections, is defined as the share of 
property tax collections in GDP. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we expect 
property tax collections to decrease with deficient enforcement, corruption, tax evasion and the 
predominance of transfers; and to increase with the size of the property tax base, government 
responsiveness, and the average tax rate. Even though there are direct measures of all these 
variables, some of them are not available for long periods of time for all Latin American 
countries. In order to maximize the number of observations, we use alternative (more common) 
variables as proxies of our variables of interest.  
We consider a variety of factors accounting for the design of fiscal arrangements, the 
level of development, the size of the property tax base, relevant differences in the 
implementation of the property tax, and basic characteristics of the political system.
24
 The 
structure of fiscal arrangements is described through measures of fiscal decentralization, the 
level of transfer dependency, and the size of government. Fiscal decentralization is defined as the 
share of sub-national expenditures over total government expenditures, and it is used to represent 
the extent of the fiscal devolution to the sub-national governments. 
25
 The dependency on 
transfers is defined as the share of intergovernmental transfers in total sub-national revenues. As 
explained, intergovernmental transfers reduce the need for collecting own revenues and, 
therefore, might reduce tax effort and the collections of the property tax. Finally, government 
size is used to account for the relative magnitude and relevancy of the public sector and its 
components, including transfer programs, in the overall economy. 
The level of development is represented by the per capita GDP. This variable provides 
information, among other things, on the levels of accumulated physical and human capital. For 
example, local governments in richer countries might have access to highly skilled personnel and 
more sophisticated equipment, so that their ability to administer and collect taxes is greater than 
that of less developed countries. Still, different levels of development can also be related with 
diverse patterns of sub-national governments‟ financing, and thus the sign of the influence on 
property tax collections remains uncertain.  
Property tax collections also depend on the value of land and structures in a country, 
which accounts for the potential property tax base. We approximate this value, following Bahl 
and Wallace (2008), with estimations computed on the basis of national wealth data provided by 
the World Bank (2006). 
26
 We also control for the share of the urban population, because the size 
and composition of the tax base as well as the amount of property tax collections can be expected 
to be quite different in rural and urban areas. In addition, we include two dummy variables to 
control for the specific characteristics of Chile, where the administration and the authority over 
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 The description and sources of the variables used in the analysis, as well as the summary statistic, are presented in 
Appendixes III and IV, respectively. 
25
 Even thought this variable does not capture the effective autonomy of sub-national government, lacking any better 
option we follow the most common practice in the decentralization literature and use this variable to proxy for the 
level of fiscal decentralization. 
26
 See Appendix II. 
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the property tax remain fully centralized; and of Ecuador and Mexico, the only countries in the 
sample where the cadastre is developed by the sub-national governments. 
27
 
In practice, sub-national governments can effectively enjoy additional fiscal autonomy 
only if the decentralization process also enhances the political representation of the population. 
Indeed, the share of local government expenditure over total government expenditures does not 
say much about the ability of taxpayers to choose their representatives and express their 
preferences for public goods, which, in turn, determines the extent of effective accountability of 
government officials and the degree of responsiveness to taxpayers‟ preferences. In order to 
account for these factors we consider two variables; the competition for public positions and an 
index of democracy. The degree of competition for public positions, we argue, serves to limit the 
ability of local authorities to take advantage of their political power, and thus helps to increase 
accountability and to contain corruption. Complementarily, the index of democracy serves to 
represent the ability of taxpayers to truly express their preferences. 
Table 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis. The first regression (1) uses a fixed 
effects model in order to control in the estimation for all unobserved specific-country 
characteristics. As we might expect, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A greater devolution of expenditure responsibilities to 
sub-national governments requires relatively more revenues, providing incentives for greater 
property tax collections. The coefficient for the dependency on transfers takes a negative sign, 
and thus is negatively related to property tax collections, and it is statistically significant at the 
5% level. This result is important because it supports our conjecture that the predominance of 
transfers can have a negative effect on tax effort. In order to control for the relative magnitude of 
intergovernmental transfers we also include an interaction term between transfers and the size of 
the (general) government with respect to the GDP. The coefficient of this variable is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the negative effect of transfers of property tax collections is reduced 
as the size of the government increases. A bigger public sector might need to count on other 
(than property) tax sources, and might also be better able to improve tax administration at every 
level and to implement “non-distorting” or “incentive-neutral” transfer programs. On average, 
the net effect of transfers on property tax collections becomes positive when the size of the 
public sector corresponds to 17.7% of the economy (displayed at the bottom of Table 5). 
The level of development, represented by the GDP per capita, has a negative effect on 
property tax collections; which is significant at the 1% level. This result might appear as 
counterintuitive, because a greater level of development is usually associated not only with 
improved tax bases and administrative and tax collection capacity, but also with greater ability 
(and maybe willingness) to pay property taxes. An alternative explanation of this result would go 
along the same lines discussed above for the case of Brazil; higher GDP per capita my signal the 
availability of other tax sources of some significance and therefore a relative decrease in the 
reliance on property taxes as a source of local revenue. A simple analysis of the sub-national tax 
                                                          
27
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mix and GDP per capita would seem to point in that direction; Figure 1(a) plots property tax 
collections as a share of sub-national taxes against GDP per capita. There appears to be a clear 
negative relationship between these variables, suggesting that the relative importance of the 
property in sub-national governments‟ financing decreases as the country GDP per capita 
increases. 
28
 
Finally, among the other controls only competition for public positions and the index of 
democracy are statistically significant. As expected, the variable used to represent accountability 
and the limits to corruption –competition for public positions, is positively related with property 
tax collections. In contrast, the coefficient of the index of democracy has a negative sign; 
suggesting that the property tax might not enjoy political acceptability. 
29
  
The second column of Table 5 presents the results of a random effects model in which we 
are able to include time-constant variables and at the same time partially controlling for country-
specific effects. The results under this specification are fairly consistent with the findings under 
fixed effects, but all controls are now significant at the 1% level. In particular, government size 
and the percentage of urban population appear to be negatively correlated with property tax 
collections.  
The time-invariant variables that are included in this estimation  are (the logarithm of) the 
estimated size of the potential tax base, a dummy that takes the value of one for Chile, and a 
dummy that assigns a value of one to the two countries of the sample in which the cadastre is 
developed locally, Ecuador and Mexico. The signs of the coefficients of the time-constant 
variables are in line with our expectations. The greater the size of the potential tax base the 
greater the relative amount of property tax collections. 
30
 On the other hand, Ecuador and Mexico 
appear as collecting fewer taxes due to the reliance on, presumably ill-equipped, sub-national tax 
administration; and Chile performs better that the average of the sample due the opposite reason. 
Regression (3) in Table 5 introduces the square of the GDP per capita in order to allow 
for a non-linear influence on property tax collections. The general results do not significantly 
differ from the previous regression, and the square of the GDP per capita is positive and  
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 The data for Chile, within the oval in Figure 1(a), exhibits a distinctive pattern, which has been accounted for by 
the country dummy in the econometric specification. 
29
 In order to account for additional country specific characteristics we also considered regional disparities in GDP 
per capita as an additional control variable. The correlation between this variable and property tax collections as a 
share of the GDP is -0.686, suggesting that countries with greater regional disparities tend to collect fewer property 
taxes. However, we do not present the results for this variable because its inclusion in the estimating equations 
drastically reduces the number of observations. 
30
 The explicit consideration of the potential tax base might also help to explain the negative sign of the urban 
population‟s coefficient. Once the size of the tax base has been accounted for, a negative relationship between urban 
population and property tax collections might suggest that urban areas concentrate more unregistered properties and 
exempted taxpayers than is the case in rural areas. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Property Tax Collections  
Dependent variable: Property tax collections (PTC) as a share of the GDP 
 
 
Fixed Effects  
 
(1) 
Random Effects  
 
(2) 
Random Effects 
 
(3) 
Random Effects 
IV a 
 
(4) 
         
Fiscal Decentralization (%) 0.00919 *** 0.01617 *** 0.01445 *** 0.03038 *** 
 (0.00242)  (0.00150)  (0.00135)  (0.00637)  
Dependency on Transfers (%) -0.01047 ** -0.01053 *** -0.00502 ** -0.02031 *** 
 (0.00509)  (0.00234) (0.00255)  (0.00697)  
Interaction term 0.00059 ** 0.00072 *** 0.00043 *** 0.00086 *** 
    (Dep.on Transfers. Government size) (0.00028)  (0.00014) (0.00015)  (0.00029)  
Government Size (% GDP) -0.01288  -0.02731 *** -0.00776  -0.04679 ** 
 (0.01554)  (0.00901) (0.00952)  (0.01991)  
Log of per capita GDP -0.17295 *** -0.28330 *** -2.65021 *** -0.10259  
 (0.04730)  (0.05883) (0.84908)  (0.11616)  
Log of per capita GDP squared     0.12901 ***   
     (0.04562)    
Log of estimated property tax base   0.27237 *** 0.26629 *** 0.40590 *** 
    (as computed in Appendix II)   (0.02755)  (0.02683)  (0.08117)  
Urban population (%) 0.00438  -0.01564 *** -0.01050 *** -0.04710 *** 
 (0.00743)  (0.00280)  (0.00326)  (0.01429)  
Municipal cadastre (dummy)    -0.35632 *** -0.36153 *** -0.33473 *** 
   (0.02223) (0.02096)  (0.05178)  
Chile (dummy)    0.85010 *** 0.83174 *** 1.17456 *** 
   (0.05660) (0.05267)  (0.16223)  
Competition for public positions 0.09501 *** 0.12712 *** 0.12667 *** 0.14642 *** 
 (0.02422)  (0.02600)  (0.02439)  (0.04218)  
Index of democracy -0.03259 *** -0.05281 *** -0.05330 *** -0.08504 *** 
 (0.00727)  (0.00804)   (0.00702)  (0.01904)  
Constant 1.68607 *** 3.53144 *** 13.66880 *** 4.51384 *** 
 (0.63587)  (0.45747)  (3.72743)  (0.74078)  
         
Observations 115  115 115  115  
Number of countries 9  9 9  9  
         
R-squared within   0.5913  0.4667 0.4487  0.1603  
R-squared between 0.1392  0.9795 0.9921  0.9252  
R-squared overall 0.1288  0.9332 0.9396  0.8367  
         
Test of overidentifying restrictions      0.233  
p-value      0.6294  
         
The mg. effect of GDP on PTC turns 
positive when GDP per capita is: 
    28,892    
         
The mg. effect of Transfers on PTC turns 
positive when government size is: 
17.7  14.6  11.7  23.6  
         
 
a  The instrumented variables are Fiscal Decentralization, Dependency on Transfers, and the interaction term between the later and 
Government Size. The instruments are log of population, political competition, openness to international trade and the price level of 
government expenditures. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors of in parentheses.  
All regressions include time periods‟ dummies (not shown) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
statistically significant at the 1% level; implying that the negative marginal effect of 
development on property tax collection decreases with per capita GDP.31  
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 The average effect of development on property tax collections turns out to be positive when the GDP per capita is 
US$28,892. That point, however, is irrelevant because no country in the sample reaches that value. 
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A relevant concern about the econometric specification is the existence of an endogenous 
relationship between some of the explanatory variables and property tax collections. In particular 
we may expect a certain degree of reverse causality; that is, we can expect the extent of fiscal 
decentralization and the amount of transfers to be influenced by the level of property tax 
collections. In order to address this problem, in regression (4) we use a Generalized Two-stage 
Least Squares (G2SLS) random effects model, where we introduce instrumental variables (IV) to 
correct possible biases in the estimators. The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization, 
dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between dependency on transfers and the size 
of government. As instruments we choose the log of population, the degree of political (party) 
competition, openness to international trade and the price level of government expenditures. 
32
 
The set of instruments is highly correlated with the three endogenous variables but uncorrelated 
with property tax collections. Moreover, the test of over-identifying restrictions (in the table) 
fails to reject the null that the set of excluded variables are valid instruments. 
33
 In general, 
although the magnitude of the coefficients exhibit relevant corrections, their signs and statistical 
significance remain roughly unaffected. 
34
  
Summarizing, property tax revenue performance improves with the extent of fiscal 
decentralization, the presence of accountability mechanisms, and the size of the potential tax 
base. In contrast, tax collections decrease with the index of democracy, higher dependency on 
transfers, and the fact that the cadastre is administered locally.  
Finally, a variable that we have considered as a potentially important determinant of 
property tax collections is the perception of corruption, which even if available, has been 
excluded from the econometric analysis due to the small number of observations. Figure 1(b) 
presents a scatter plot where we verify an apparent correlation between property tax collections 
as a share of GDP and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index 
assigns a greater value to those countries that are less corrupt, thus the positively sloped trend 
line suggests that less corrupt countries are, in average, able to collect more property taxes.
 35
 
This analysis provides important insights about the determinants of property tax 
collections in Latin America. In principle, given that we do not have information about what the 
“correct” level of property tax collections is, we cannot say a priori whether increasing tax 
collections is a desirable thing. However, it is well known that Latin American countries perform 
below international standards, and since we have no reason to presume that their sub-national 
expenditure needs are particularly low, then we can conclude that certain factors have an 
excessively (undesirable) negative influence on property tax collections. The dependency on  
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 See Appendixes III and IV for a description of the variables used and summary statistics. 
33
 The test of over-identifying restrictions was developed for Stata by Schaffer and Stillman (2006). 
34
 The only exception is the level of development, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. We cannot know, 
however, if this change is due to the correction of a bias or due to possible collinearity introduced by the 
instrumentation for the endogenous variables. 
35
 The Corruption Perceptions Index is prepared by Transparency International, and the data can be retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
                  Explaining Property Tax Collections in Developing Countries: The Case of Latin America                    31       
 
Figure 1: Relationship of property tax collections with GDP per capita and corruption 
 
   (a) (b) 
         
 
transfers and local responsibility for the implementation of the cadastre are two relevant factors 
in reducing property tax collections and over which the authorities might have some degree of 
control. For instance, the design of the fiscal decentralization might incorporate new sub-national 
own-revenue sources, such that the local authorities and their constituencies internalize the value 
of revenue autonomy and start exercising higher tax effort in order to finance expanded local 
services. Still, greater autonomy at the local level does not mean that complex, long-lasting and 
expensive tasks like building a complete cadastre of properties can be undertaken without 
assistance from the central government. The movement towards greater revenue collections and 
autonomy, especially in developing countries, must be gradual, with a central government that is 
able to support and assist local administrations in their transition to more decentralized and 
efficient arrangements. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Successful decentralization in terms of efficiency and fiscal responsibility depends 
critically on the provision of adequate revenue autonomy to sub-national governments. The 
property tax is widely considered as the most appropriate instrument to promote tax autonomy at 
the local level, while other taxes such as vehicle taxes, local excise, piggyback personal income 
taxes, or business permit taxes should also play an important role in the promotion of local tax 
autonomy. Still, it is difficult to argue strongly for greater property tax autonomy when many 
local governments in Latin America appear not to be taking advantage of the autonomy that is 
currently granted in the laws. An important piece of any potential indictment is that, judging 
from what is collected in other regions of the world; actual property tax collections in the region 
are a small fraction of what appears to be the revenue potential. In this context, any attempts to 
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achieve more efficient forms of decentralization in the Latin America region via increased 
revenue autonomy for local governments would need to grapple with the question of how to 
achieve significant improvement in local property tax collections.  
Property tax collections are determined by a wide array of factors. These factors include, 
among others, the extent or depth of fiscal decentralization reforms, the structure of sub-national 
financing, the level of development, the potential size of the property tax base, and basic 
institutional characteristics of the public sector. In particular, we find that the predominance of 
intergovernmental transfers in the sub-national finance systems have a negative effect on 
property tax collections and that, for the most part, sub-national governments in Latin America 
are unwilling or do not seem capable of taking advantage of the devolution of this revenue 
source. In this context, getting the property tax to perform rightly may take more than just 
addressing the issues, complex on their own, of designing, administering and enforcing the 
property tax itself. For instance, we argue that government responsiveness towards taxpayers‟ 
needs and improvements in cultural factors like tax morale might be necessary to increase 
property tax collections.  
Effective devolution of the property tax to sub-national governments should be 
accompanied by certain preconditions. Some of these preconditions are not currently met by 
some Latin American countries, and thus provide a good starting point to draw meaningful 
policy recommendations to guide future reforms. Of course, country circumstances and 
conditions differ, so not all recommendations should be expected to apply to each case.  
There is a clear need for most local governments to develop their administrative and 
technical capacities. This rather obvious recommendation has for long been recognized in the 
literature, but it remains as an unavoidable and pending task. Two possible strategies to move 
forward in this regard are the implementation of asymmetric property tax assignments and the 
provision of technical and financial assistance to those local governments with lower 
administrative capacity. Moreover, improving the performance of the property tax in the region 
would also benefit from strengthening institutions and re-shaping cultural attitudes. In particular, 
it is necessary to make local authorities understand the importance of own tax revenues and to 
show the taxpayers the connection between property tax payments and local services. This will 
not be an easy task, but successful experiences such as those provided by the cities of Bogota and 
Lima might serve as relevant examples. 
36
 Finally, some reforms to the intergovernmental 
finance system may be necessary. It is particularly important to correct the incentives provided 
by the system of transfers. In this paper we provide some evidence of a potential negative effect 
of intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These issues still need to be carefully 
investigated.  
Overall, and somewhat paradoxically, greater revenue autonomy for Latin American 
local governments in the form of a more effective use of the property tax might depend in some 
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 See Martinez-Vazquez (2010). 
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cases on a deeper involvement of the central government in the administration, collection and 
enforcement of the property tax. Making property taxes work more effectively in Latin America 
will continue to be a complex challenge and no simple „silver bullet‟ simple solutions are in 
sight. Attention must be given to “internal” factors, including issues of administration and local 
capacity, but equal attention must be also given to an array of factors that are “external” to the 
property tax collection process itself.  
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Appendix I:   Main characteristics of property tax systems in Latin America 
 
   Administration 
Country Revenue 
assignment 
Authority to change the tax 
structure 
Cadastre Billing and collection Appeals Assessment 
       
Argentina Provincial and 
local govs. 
Provincial and local 
governments 
Cadastral office Provincial and local 
governments 
Formal appeal 
processes at both 
government levels 
Market Value 
Bolivia Municipal 
governments 
Central gov. (Ministerio de 
Finanzas) along with municipal 
governments 
Dirección Nacional de 
Catastro Urbano 
Municipal Governments  Market Value 
Brazil Central (rural) 
and municipal 
(urban) govs. 
Central and Municipal 
Governments 
Central (rural) and 
municipal (urban) govs. 
Municipal Governments  Market Value 
Chile Municipal 
governments 
Central Government Servicios de Impuestos 
Internos(SII) 
Central government 
(Treasury) 
Internal Tax Service, 
Special Appeals Court 
on Property Valuation, 
Supreme Court 
Area by location for 
land, construction 
value for buildings 
Colombia Municipal  
governments 
National Congress defines tax 
base and rate. A range of rates 
is established within which 
municips. are free to choose 
Instituto Geográfico Agustín 
Codazzi (IGAC) 
 
Municipal governments 
(Secretarias de Hacienda) 
Cadastral Division, 
petition tax 
administration 
Market Value 
Costa Rica Municipal 
governments 
 Municipal governments 
(Catastro Nacional) 
Municipal governments  Market Value 
 
 
Ecuador Municipal 
governments 
Central gov. along with 
Municipalities‟ ability to set 
rates 
Municipal governments Municipal governments  Market Value 
Guatemala Central and 
municipal 
governments 
Central and Municipal 
governments 
Central government 
(Dirección General de 
Catastro) 
Mainly Central gov., 
except for municipalities 
with technical and 
administrative capacity 
 Market Value 
Honduras Municipal 
governments 
Municipal governments Municipal governments Municipal governments  Market Value, use of 
the land, location and 
improvements 
Mexico Municipal 
governments 
State and municipal 
governments jointly 
Municipal governments Local governments 
(Local Treasury 
Offices) 
Fiscal authority 
judicial branch 
Market value 
      (continued…) 
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   Administration 
Country Revenue 
assignment 
Authority to change the tax 
structure 
Cadastre Billing and collection Appeals Assessment 
Nicaragua Municipal 
governments 
Central government with 
Municipalities‟ ability to grant 
additional exemptions 
Comisión Nacional de 
Catastro 
Municipal governments  Cadastral value 
Panama Central 
government 
Central and Provincial 
governments 
Central government Provincial governments   
Paraguay Municipal 
governments 
and 
Departments 
Central government 
(Ministerio de Finanzas 
Públicas) 
Mainly central gov., 
except for those 
municips. with technical 
and adm. capacity 
Municipal governments  Market Value 
Peru Municipal and 
District 
governments 
Central, Municipal and 
District governments 
Central government 
[Comisión Nacional de 
Tasaciones (CONATA)] 
Municipal and District 
governments 
 Market Value 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central 
government 
Central government Central government 
(Dirección General del 
Catastro Nacional) 
Central government  Value greater than 
approximately 
US$150,000 
Uruguay Departments Central and Municipal 
government, along with 
Departments 
Central gov. (rural; 
Dirección Nacional de 
Catastro) and 
Departments (urban) 
Departments  Market Value plus 
additional 20% for 
improvements the 
rural cases 
Venezuela Municipal 
governments 
Municipal governments Municipal governments Municipal governments  Market Value 
 
Source: Martinez-Vazquez, Noiset and Rider (2010).   
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Appendix II:  Estimates of potential property tax base by country and region, 2000 
 (in US$ per capita) 
 
R  
e   
g    
i    
o    
n 
 
Potential rural tax base 
Potential  
urban tax base Potential 
base of the 
property tax 
Country Cropland Pastureland 
Cropland + 
Pasteurland 
Urban land + 
Structures * 
 Latin America      
SA Argentina 3,632 2,754 6,386 18,301 24,687 
CA Belize 5,201 133 5,334 9,298 14,632 
SA Bolivia 1,550 541 2,091 2,021 4,112 
SA Brazil 1,998 1,311 3,309 9,234 12,543 
SA Chile 2,443 1,001 3,444 10,235 13,679 
SA Colombia 1,911 978 2,889 4,665 7,554 
CA Costa Rica 5,811 1,310 7,121 7,989 15,110 
SA Ecuador 5,263 1,065 6,328 2,721 9,049 
CA El Salvador   404 395 799 3,935 4,734 
CA Guatemala 1,697 218 1,915 2,967 4,882 
SA Guyana 5,324 252 5,576 3,192 8,768 
CA Honduras 1,189 595 1,784 2,934 4,718 
NA Mexico 1,195 721 1,916 18,155 20,071 
CA Nicaragua 867 410 1,277 1,646 2,923 
CA Panama 3,256 664 3,920 10,551 14,471 
SA Paraguay 2,193 1,215 3,408 4,290 7,698 
SA Peru 1,480 341 1,821 5,326 7,147 
SA Suriname 2,113 210 2,323 5,571 7,894 
SA Uruguay 3,621 5,549 9,170 10,330 19,500 
SA Venezuela, R.B. de   1,086 581 1,667 13,049 14,716 
       
 The Caribbean      
 Antigua and Barbuda 1,003 468 1,471 37,151 38,622 
 Barbados 190 210 400 17,398 17,798 
 Dominica 5,274 553 5,827 14,661 20,488 
 Dominican Republic   1,980 386 2,366 5,480 7,846 
 Grenada   572 67 639 15,444 16,083 
 Haiti 668 112 780 576 1,356 
 Jamaica 824 152 976 9,723 10,699 
 St. Kitts and Nevis   0 0 0 34,197 34,197 
 St. Lucia   3,394 108 3,502 13,018 16,520 
 St. Vincent   2,106 109 2,215 10,041 12,256 
 Trinidad and Tobago 444 54 498 13,871 14,369 
       
Regional averages      
Latin America 1,973 1,114 3,086 10,608 13,695 
     Central America (CA) 1,848 493 2,342 4,116 6,458 
     South and North America (SA and NA) 1,983 1,164 3,147 11,137 14,284 
The Caribbean 1,232 226 1,458 5,139 6,596 
       
Source: World Bank (2006) 
* As computed by Roy & Wallace, 2008. The tax base reported by the WB includes other produced capital that we would 
not tax (durable goods for example). The WB report follows Kunte (1998), who assumes that urban land corresponds to 
33% of the value of structures and, in turn, that structures correspond to 72% of the value of total capital. 
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 Appendix III: Variable description and data sources 
 
 
Variable  Description and sources 
  
Property tax collections 
 
Share of property tax collections over GDP (in percentage). 
Source: ECLAC. 
  
Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Share of sub-national expenditures over total government expenditures (in percentage). 
Source: ECLAC.  
  
Dependency on 
Transfers  
Share of intergovernmental transfers over total sub-national revenues (in percentage). 
Source: ECLAC. 
  
Government size Government share of real GDP per capita (in percentage). 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009). 
  
Log of per capita GDP 
 
Based on per capita real GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity, PPP).  
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009). 
  
Log of estimated 
property tax base  
Based on the sum of the potential property tax base for rural and urban areas, as 
computed in Appendix II with data from World Bank (2006). Figures correspond to 
year 2000, and are expressed on $US per capita. 
  
Urban population 
 
Share of the total population living in urban areas (in percentage). 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
  
Competition for public 
positions 
 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Extent to which subordinates enjoy equal 
opportunities to become superordinates. 
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm 
  
Index of democracy  POLITY2 is a modified version of the POLITY, which is obtained by subtracting the 
value of the scaled value representing AUTOCRATIC (range 0-10) from the value of 
DEMOCRATIC (range 0-10) in order to provide a unified polity scale ranging from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).  
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm 
 
Log of population 
 
Based on population (thousands). 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009). 
 
Political competition 
 
It combines two concepts: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political 
competition, and the extent of government restriction on political competition. It ranges 
from 1 (Suppressed competition) to 10 (Institutionalized Electoral). 
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm 
  
Openness to trade  
 
Openness in constant prices: Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per capita; 
Laspeyres (in percentage). 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009). 
  
Price of government 
expenditures  
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over government consumption. 
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009). 
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Appendix IV: Summary statistics 
 
 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Observations 
        
Property tax collections  overall 0.39 0.21 0.06 0.74 N = 115 
 between  0.20 0.12 0.64 n = 9 
 within  0.06 0.16 0.52 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Fiscal Decentralization  overall 21.93 13.86 0.65 47.16 N = 115 
 between  13.71 1.17 44.76 n = 9 
 within  3.78 5.65 30.15 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Dependency on Transfers overall 58.62 19.09 20.53 93.04 N = 115 
 between  19.03 23.16 89.46 n = 9 
 within  4.21 39.44 69.23 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Government size overall 15.22 2.92 11.39 22.55 N = 115 
 between  2.55 12.47 18.88 n = 9 
 within  1.74 8.83 19.74 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Log of per capita GDP (PPP) overall 8.86 0.42 8.06 9.98 N = 115 
 between  0.41 8.20 9.36 n = 9 
 within  0.19 8.37 9.48 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Per capita GDP (PPP) overall 7,690 3,511 3,164 21,548 N = 115 
 between  2,998 3,639 12,189 n = 9 
 within  1,981 2,600 17,050 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Log of estimated property tax base overall 2.48 0.50 1.41 3.21 N = 115 
 (per capita $US of year 2000) between  0.56 1.41 3.21 n = 9 
 within  0.00 2.48 2.48 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Urban population overall 74.21 11.21 54.66 91.80 N = 115 
 between  11.36 57.21 89.59 n = 9 
 within  1.81 69.54 79.36 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Competition for political positions overall 2.71 0.53 1.00 3.00 N = 115 
 between  0.30 2.22 3.00 n = 9 
 within  0.44 1.49 3.49 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Index of democracy overall 7.44 1.81 0.00 10.00 N = 115 
 between  1.06 5.22 9.00 n = 9 
 within  1.46 2.22 10.22 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Log of population overall 10.27 0.96 8.60 12.15 N = 115 
 between  1.11 8.71 12.10 n = 9 
 within  0.07 10.11 10.43 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Political competition overall 8.27 0.99 7.00 10.00 N = 115 
 between  0.87 7.00 9.13 n = 9 
 within  0.67 7.16 9.71 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Openness to trade overall 50.74 21.99 21.22 138.80 N = 115 
 between  24.44 23.54 107.66 n = 9 
 within  8.86 28.20 81.89 T-bar = 12.8 
        
Price level of gov. expenditures overall 40.02 15.67 14.04 75.44 N = 115 
 between  11.87 18.07 55.91 n = 9 
 within  10.76 6.34 66.38 T-bar = 12.8 
        
 
 
